Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem by Kirgis, Frederic L.
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 2002 
Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem 
Frederic L. Kirgis 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, kirgisr@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 421 (2002). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
FUZZY LOGIC AND THE SLIDING SCALE THEOREM 
Frederic L. Kirgis* 
[Mlost legal problems end as questions of degree.' 
The law operates principally in the context of ordinary transactions 
and relationships. Consequently it is important to develop insights into 
how it operates in the everyday world. To resolve recurring legal issues 
in everyday affairs, judges and other decision-makers sometimes use 
formulas. When a legal formula contains two elements, as several do, a ' 
process of fuzzy logic produces a result that is a function of a sliding 
scale between the elements. Thus, if physical presence in a new state + 
intent to remain = change of domicile, there will be degrees of each 
element, such that the degree of physical presence (which could be 
treated as a fraction between zero and one or as a point on a diagram 
where each of two axes runs from zero to one) combines with the de- 
gree of intent to remain, to produce a result-either acquisition of a 
new domicile or retention of the old one. The process and the result is 
best illustrated by a diagram that, in most instances, resembles an 
economist's demand curve. The placement and slope of the curve will 
depend on the particular formula, and the curve may shift depending on 
what is at stake. The process is at work in several fields of law includ- 
ing contracts, civil procedure and conflict of laws. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Theorenz 
B. Fuzzy Logic 
Law School Association Alumni Professor, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I am grateful to my research assistant, Aaron Shumway, for his excellent work throughout 
the preparation of this Article, and to my colleague, Lewis H. LaRue, for introducing me to the 
literature of fuzzy logic. 
1. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (Douglas, J.). 
422 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 53:2:421 
C. An Example 
11. CONTRACT ISSUES 
A. Liquidated Damages Clauses 
B. Unconscionability 
111. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A. Preliminary Injunctions 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
1V. CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUES (OTHER THAN LONG ARM 
JURISDICTION) 
A. Change of Domicile 
B. Choice of Law in Tort and Contract Cases 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. The Theorem 
Legal norms and procedures provide structure for the ordinary 
transactions and relationships that persons enter into and play out each 
day. Over time, the structure tends to become formulaic, containing 
two or more elements. The elements may be facts (objective or subjec- 
tive) or they may be reflections of value judgments (for example, judg- 
ments about what is or is not fair). Each element is said to be either 
present or missing. According to the typical two-element formula, if 
elements a and b are both present, and only if both are present, a given 
legal result is ~ b t a i n e d . ~  That the formula says so does not necessarily 
make it so. The premise of this Article is that in practice it often- 
perhaps usually-is not so. The premise is most readily illustrated by 
focusing on formulas that are limited to, or are dominated by, just two 
elements and that consequently can be diagramed in two dimensions. 
At least in the fields to be examined in this Article, the fulfillment 
of each stated element is a matter of degree and the attainment or non- 
attainment of the legal result emanates from a sliding scale reflecting 
the degree to which each of the two elements has been satisfied. The 
sliding scale theorem may be simply stated: The greater the degree to 
which one element is satisfied, the lesser the degree to which the other 
2. To give an example that will be developed later in this Article, if a person (a) has some 
physical presence in a new state, and (b) demonstrates an intent to live there indefinitely, he or 
she has established a new domicile. Some legal formulas have more than two elements. but the 
focus here is on those cases in which there are only two stated elements, or those in which two 
elements are dominant even though there may also be some subsidiary ones. The present study 
deals with civil proceedings and civil responsibility, as distinguished from criminal law. 
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need be. The challenge is to demonstrate that it is at work in practice, 
and to show how it operates. This may be done by examining cases in 
discrete fields of law. The fields investigated here are sufficiently rep- 
resentative to suggest that the sliding scale theorem may apply to a 
wide variety of dual-element formulas in the law.3 
Sometimes courts and other decision-makers recognize that they are 
using such a sliding scale;4 more often, they do not recognize it or, in 
any event, do not articulate it.5 An unarticulated use of a sliding scale 
frequently appears from the decision-makers' emphasis on only one of 
the elements while lip service is given to the other, or from their 
strained efforts to demonstrate that both elements have been met.6 
B. Fuzzy Logic 
The sliding scale principle may be seen as a manifestation of fuzzy 
logic, which holds that everything temporal can be a matter of degree.' 
Under fuzzy logic, zero and one are simply the opposite ends of a con- 
t i n ~ u m . ~  Although some phenomena reflect true dichotomies ("crisp 
sets"), a great deal of what we can observe falls along a scale between 
the true extremes or falls in a set with inherently fuzzy bo~ndaries.~ 
Thus, what we think of as a full glass (a glass filled to a level just far 
enough below the rim to prevent spillage in ordinary use) is a ninety 
percent full glass and a ten percent empty glass. A game won at the 
expense of an injury to a key player is a game eighty percent won and 
twenty percent lost. As one text has put it: 
3. I have demonstrated the sliding scale concept elsewhere, as it relates to two discrete 
areas of international law. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 146 (1987); Frederic L. Kirgis. The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era. 
88 AM. J .  INT'L L. 304 (1994). Some other legal scholars have used the concept without 
identifying a broad theorem. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future 
of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 852 (1999); William M. Richman, Pan 11-A 
Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction. 72 CAL. 
L. REV. 1328. 1336-46 (1984). The present Article widens the scope of the inquiry without 
revisiting international law. 
4. See, e.g., Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (referring to a "balancing approach" requiring a "certain quantum of procedural plus a 
certain quantum of substantive unconscionabilityn). 
5. See, e.g., In re Estate of Elson, 458 N.E.2d 637 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (balancing factors 
in change of domicile case without articulating the use of a sliding scale). 
6. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (No. 00-1293); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., 
907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995). 
7. See, e.g., BART KOSKO. FUZZY THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FUZZY LOGIC 18 
(1993); DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC 12 (1993). 
8. KOSKO. supra note 7. at 18. 
9. See MARTIN GARDNER, WEIRD WATER & FUZZY LOGIC 158 (1996); GEORGE J. KLIR & 
TINA A. FOLGER, FUZZY SETS, UNCERTAINTY. AND INFORMATION 3 (1988). 
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Temperature, distance, beauty, friendliness, greenness, pleas- 
ure-all come on a sliding scale. The Canadian Rockies are very 
beautiful. My next-door neighbor is fairly lazy. Boston is quite 
close to Cape Cod. Likewise, objects are objects to degrees. 
Astronomers say Jupiter is a star to a weak extent. Egypt was 
partly a colony of Britain; the United States was largely one. A 
dagger is very much a weapon, while a curtain rod is scarcely a 
weapon at all. Such sliding scales often make it impossible to 
distinguish members of a class from nonmembers. When does a 
hill become a mountain, or a pond a lake? How far is far?'' 
Fuzzy logic in its full regalia is much more splendid than this." For 
purposes of developing a sliding scale theorem, however, we need only 
accept that in the observable world, hot and cold, or fast and slow, are 
not absolutes. There are degrees of "hotness" and "coldness." We are 
dealing, in other words, with fuzzy sets. 
Nor do we need to accept fuzzy logic in every corner of human ex- 
istence in order to accept it for much of what can be observed; in par- 
ticular, we need not necessarily accept it as ubiquitous in order to find 
it at work in the law. Indeed, we might expect to find it especially in 
the law, since so many legal concepts and doctrines have fuzzy bounda- 
ries. Consider, for example, the technique (though not the language) of 
fuzzy logic in the classic two-part article written by Lon L. Fuller and 
William R. Perdue, Jr., in the 1930s, The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages.12 Fuller and Perdue attacked the then-prevailing view that a 
promise is either contractual-in which case expectancy damages are to 
be awarded for a breach-or it is not contractual-in which case no 
damages should be awarded.13 Professor Fuller later said, "I consider 
the contribution made in my article on the reliance interest to lie, not in 
calling attention to the reliance interest itself, but in an analysis which 
breaks down the contract-no contract dichotomy, and substitutes an as- 
cending scale of enforceability. "I4 
As all students of the law know, fuzziness inheres in the law of 
property as well. According to a leading treatise, "[t]itle, as all prop- 
10. MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 12. 
11. See Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Rea- 
soning, F m y  Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L REV. 1243, 1289-99, 1324-30 (1999). 
12. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue. Jr.. The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I .  46 
YALE L.J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter Reliance Interest I ] ;  L.L. Fuller &William R. Perdue, Jr.. The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 2: 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937) [hereinafter Reliance Interest 
21 - 
13. Reliance Interest 2 ,  supra note 12, at 418-20. 
14. Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Professor, Duke University School of Law, to Karl N. Lle- 
wellyn, Professor, Columbia University School of Law (Dec. 8, 1938), reprinted in ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY. DOCTRINE, 
AND PRACTICE 41 (4th ed. 2001). 
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erty rights, is a relative concept. A person may have 'title' to property 
as against one person but not another."" Nor is fuzziness limited to 
mundane areas of the law. Faced with the problem of deciding whether 
it had admiralty jurisdiction over salvage rights to the R.M.S. Titanic 
lying 400 miles off the coast of Newfoundland in 12,500 feet of water, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came up with the concept of 
"shared sovereignty" by which it asserted "imperfect" in rem jurisdic- 
tion over the wreck, even though it recognized that admiralty tribunals 
in other countries might do so too.I6 
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed fuzziness as well. 
Declining to review the impeachment conviction of a federal judge, the 
Supreme Court said: 
A controversy is nonjusticiable-i.e., involves a political 
question-where there is "a textually demonstrable constitu- 
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart- 
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan- 
dards for resolving it . . . ." [Tlhe concept of a textual com- 
mitment to a coordinate political department is not completely 
separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially 
manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there 
is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate 
branch. l7 
The questions to be examined here are whether we can find fuzzy 
logic at work in dual-element formulas across selected fields of the law, 
and if so, how it operates in those fields. If it is indeed at work, it 
should not only supply an interesting theorem about how the law works; 
it should also help us predict how cases within its ambit will be de- 
cided. No claim is made that it is a precise predictive tool; just that it is 
itelpful in those situations where it operates. 
C. An Example 
To give an example that will be developed more fully below, it is 
generally said that for a person to acquire a new domicile, there must 
be (a) a voluntary physical presence in the new state, and (b) an intent 
to make a home there." In practice, the more attached the physical 
ppppp - 
15. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 1 (4th 
ed. 1991). 
16. R.M.S. Titanic. Inc. v. Haver. 171 F.3d 943, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1999). 
17. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 217 (1962)) (citations omitted). 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $8 15-18 (1971). 
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presence, the less exacting the decision-maker will be regarding a 
showing of intent (though some showing of intent will still be re- 
quired).Ig The reverse is also true: the clearer the intent to remain in- 
definitely, the less connected to the new territory the presence must 
be.*' 
The sliding scale between these two elements may be illustrated by 
what looks like an economist's demand curve. The precise location and 
slope of the curve will shift depending on the ultimate issue to which 
the person's change of domicile is relevant, but the sliding scale princi- 
ple is at work no matter what the ultimate issue is. In the diagram, the 
vertical axis represents the extent to which the person has established a 
physical presence in the new state. The horizontal axis represents the 
extent of the person's demonstrated resolve to put down roots there. 
The further up on the vertical axis, the more settled the person is in the 
new state; at the top, the person would be fully (100%) settled there. 
The further to the right on the horizontal axis, the clearer the resolve to 
stay; at the far right end, the person would be absolutely certain (at that 







I ,  
I\ Domicile changed 
B\ 
- L A  A 
? '  I 
1 \ I 
1 \, 
I ' ., i 
Extent of demonstrated resolve to stay 
19. See discussion infra Part 1V.A. 
20. See discussion infra Part 1V.A. 
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At any point along either axis, relevant factual influences are in 
play to some degree. Thus, at any point along the horizontal axis, such 
factors as the likely duration of the person's employment in the state, 
the extent of the person's tolerance of (or preference for) the physical 
characteristics of the area (e.g., mountains, seashore, climate, air qual- 
ity) and the availability of amenities (e. g., sporting events, theaters, 
shopping) are in combination to form a fuzzy set. At the origin of an 
axis, there is an "empty set;" at the end of an axis, there is a "total set" 
for that axis." 
Within the constraint "that an object's degrees of membership in 
complementary groups must sum to unity"22 (i.e., must total one on a 
scale of zero to one, or 100% on a scale of zero percent to 100%) fuzzy 
logic is intentionally imprecise. Thus, in the diagram, very often the 
location of a point on either axis is more a matter of judgment than of 
precise observation. Consequently the diagrams used throughout this 
Article cannot be used as a bright-line predictor of outcomes in particu- 
lar cases. Rather, the diagrams illustrate what is actually going on, in a 
form that has been simplified enough to be manageable, yet sufficiently 
focused on the relevant factors to be meaningful to students and practi- 
tioners of the law. 
In Figure 1 above, any combination of established physical presence 
and a demonstrated resolve to remain that falls above the curve (e.g., at 
the intersection of the two dotted lines at point A) results in a change of 
domicile to the new state; any combination below the curve (as at point 
B) leaves the domicile unchanged. Point B would represent, for exam- 
ple, a person in the military who has been assigned to a relatively long- 
term duty station in a new state, but who has not demonstrated any real 
intent to stay once the military service is completed. 
The fields selected for examination here are basic to the law. This 
Article will examine how the principle applies and adapts itself to dis- 
crete issues of contract law, civil procedure and conflict of laws.= 
A. Liquidated Damages Clauses 
According to the current Restatement of Contracts, a liquidated 
-- 
21. See Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, SCI. AM., July 1993, at 76, 80 (illustrat- 
ing this concept in a non-legal context). 
22. Id. at 76. 
23. Other fruitful areas of further inquiry include international law, see supra note 3, and 
constitutional criminal procedure. See United States v. Chaidez. 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(applying a sliding scale approach to determine the constitutionality of searches and seizures). 
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damages clause in a contract is enforceable, "but only at an amount that 
is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the 
breach and the difficulties of proof of 1 0 ~ s . " ~ ~  Although this is stated as 
a reasonableness test consisting of two independent elements-(a) the 
anticipated or actual loss (either one will normally suffice), and (b) the 
difficulty of proving a loss-the Restatement's comment makes it clear 
that the two elements are interdependent: 
A determination whether the amount fixed is a penalty turns on 
a combination of these two factors. If the difficulty of proof of 
loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approxima- 
tion of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other hand, the dif- 
ficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that 
appro~imation.~' 
The common law cases bear this out, though they do not all say so. 
However, at least one state Supreme Court has been quite explicit. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has said in a case involving a liquidated 
damages clause in an employment contract that there are three factors 
in determining the validity of the clause.26 It said the first-whether the 
parties intended to provide for damages or for a penalty-was rarely 
helpf~l .~ '  The other two were the traditional ones. The court said: 
The second factor-the "difficulty of ascertainment" test- 
assists in determining the reasonableness of the clause. The 
greater the difficulty of ascertaining damages due to breach, the 
more probable it is that the stipulated damages are reasonable. . 
. . . .  
The third factor-does the clause represent a reasonable 
forecast of harm caused by the breach-is intertwined with the 
second factor.28 
When the liquidated amount in a contract is reasonable in light of 
either the anticipated or actual loss, as it was in the Wisconsin case, the 
courts pay little attention to the difficulty of ascertaining damages, at 
least if it is not an adhesion ~ontract .~ '  When the loss would be quite 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 356(1) (1981). 
25. Id. at cmt. b. 
26. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593. 600 (Wis. 1985). 
27. Koenings, 377 N.W.2d at 600. 
28. Id. (citations omitted). 
29. See id.; see also Farmers Export Co. v. MIV Georgis Prois, 799 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 
1986); Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022 (Conn. 1980); Taos Constr. Co. v. Penzel 
Constr. Co.. 750 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. App. 1988); Truck Rent-A-Center. Inc. v. Puritan Farms 
2nd. Inc., 361 N.E.2d 1015 (N.Y. 1977). 
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difficult to ascertain in advance, the courts are inclined to uphold a liq- 
uidated damages clause without close examination of reasonableness- 
even of reasonableness with the benefit of hind~ight.~' In practice, how- 
ever, the reasonableness element is likely to weigh more heavily in the 
equation than is the difficulty-of-ascertainment element.31 
The analysis under article 2 of the U.C.C. is essentially the same. 
Section 2-718(1) puts forth three elements for a valid liquidated dam- 
ages clause-the two we have been considering, plus "the inconven- 
ience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."32 
Professor Hawkland says that the three stated elements are simply fac- 
tors to consider in determining whether a liquidated damages clause is 
r ea~onab le .~~  The third element, he says, probably illustrates a common 
situation that falls under the second element relating to the difficulty of 
proof of loss; otherwise, it is difficult to understand what purpose it 
serves.34 Hawkland adds that, contrary to his earlier view, it is not nec- 
essary to satisfy each of the elements; instead, they are indicators of 
reas~nableness.~' The cases under section 2-718(1) tend to use the 
common law approach-the sliding scale.36 
As one would expect, courts are likely to shift the sliding scale to 
require a greater degree of compliance with the variable elements when 
the liquidated damages clause appears in an adhesion contract. A court 
may strike down a liquidated damages clause in an adhesion contract as 
unconscionable if it does not closely approximate the anticipated or 
actual damages (without much or any reference to the difficulty of 
proof of 10s~)~ '  or the court may simply apply stricter scrutiny to each 
of the two traditional elements than courts normally do when a contract, 
30. See, e.g., Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1989); Better Food Mkts v. Am. 
Dist. Tel. Co.. 253 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1953); Growney v. CMH Real Estate Co., 238 N.W.2d 240 
(Neb. 1976). If the actual damage turns out to be zero, some courts will decline to enforce a 
clause liquidating damages at a substantial sum, even if it was a reasonable estimate of difficult- 
to-determine damages as of the date of the contract. See Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc. v. Sloan, 870 
F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1989); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 8 356 cmt. b (1981) 
(calling this an "extreme case"). But see Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114. 1116-17 (Mass. 
1999). 
31. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OFCONTRACTS 591-92 (4th 
ed. 1998); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 844-47 (3d ed. 1999). 
32. U.C.C. 5 2-718(1) (2000). 
33. 2 WILLtAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES 8 2-718:2 (1998); see 
also Roy Ryden Anderson, Liquidated Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 SW. 
L.J. 1083, 1092 (1988). 
34. HAWKLAND, supra note 33. 5 2-718:4. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., Grumman Flexible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980); Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden. 363 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Chien v. 
Tova Realty. 573 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991); Baker v. Int'l Record Syndicate. Inc., 
812 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 1091. 
37. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163-64 (5th 
ed. 2000) and cases cited therein. 
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or at least the liquidated damages clause, is subject to nego t i a t i~n .~~  As 
one state supreme court has put it, "courts are beginning to look with 
favor upon stipulated damage provisions between parties who have 
equality of opportunity for understanding and insisting upon their 
rights."39 The implication, of course, is that courts will look with less 
favor on these provisions when there is no such equality of opportu- 
n i ~ . ~  
In the diagram below, the curve shifts to the northeast when the 
terms of the liquidated damages clause are non-negotiable. The diagram 
relates only to liquidated damages clauses, as distinguished from 
clauses limiting consequential damages. 
Figure 2 
Proximity to J! 
mountof 
anticipated j 7 
oractual 1 4  \ 
1 4 ! damages ,
1 \> k 
! . i 's, 
I ' . '. 
i . \'\ 




1 :  i 
Difficulty of proof or ascertainment 
In Figure 2, the lower curve (K-1) is the validation curve for a liq- 
uidated damages clause in a negotiated (or at least a negotiable) con- 
tract. The upper curve (K-2) represents a contract containing a non- 
38. See, e.g., H.J .  McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 55 A.2d 793 (Md. 1947); Lee Oldsmobile, 363 
A.2d at 274-76; Chien, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58. 
39. Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 770 (Okla. 1965) (quoted with approval in 
Charles J .  Goetz & Robert E. Scott. Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation 
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 554, 593 n.104 (1977)). 
40. See Weber v. Riviera. 841 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Mont. 1992) (citing Waggoner and striking 
down a rigid liquidated damages clause in a form contract). 
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negotiable liquidated damages clause. The curves approach the vertical 
axis more closely than they do the horizontal axis, reflecting the courts' 
greater inclination to uphold a clause relatively high on the proximity 
scale and relatively low on the difficulty-of-ascertainment scale than 
vice-versa. 
Any combination of the two relevant factors that intersects below 
the K-1 curve (as at point A) would lead a court not to enforce even a 
negotiated clause; any combination that intersects above the K-2 curve 
(as at point B) would be upheld, even if the clause was non-negotiable. 
An intersection between the curves (as at point C) would result in up- 
holding a negotiated or negotiable clause, but striking down a non- 
negotiable one. 
Point C represents an actual case, H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wi~ner.~' A 
cannery agreed to buy about eleven tons of tomatoes from a farmer dur- 
ing the growing season at an agreed price, and had the farmer sign its 
standard form ~ontract.~' The contract contained a clause setting liqui- 
dated damages at $300 if the farmer breached.43 Although the clause on 
its face was applicable no matter how early or late in the season the 
farmer breached, experience showed that farmers were likely to breach 
fixed-price contracts, if at all, late in the season when supply became 
scarce and spot market prices rose.44 The $300 figure was tailored to 
such a prospective breach.45 The farmer did breach late in the season, 
causing the cannery actual damages of $275.46 The court rejected the 
liquidated damages clause because it could have been invoked even if 
the farmer had breached earlier in the season when the stipulated 
amount would have been considerably in excess of the actual  damage^.^' 
A negotiated clause surely would have been upheld.48 
B. Unconscionability 
The unconscionability doctrine, codified for the sale of goods in 
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302,49 extends beyond that genre 
41. 55 A.2d 793 (Md. 1947). 
42. Wisner. 55 A.2d at 794. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 794-95. 
45. Id. at 795. 
46. Id. at 796. 
47. Wisner, 55 A.2d at 796. 
48. See 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 383-84 (2d ed. 1964) (espousing an 
outcome inconsistent with Wisner, without distinguishing between adhesion and non-adhesion 
contracts); see also Ian R. Macneil. Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies. 47 CORNELL .Q. 
495, 511-13 (1962). 
49. U.C.C. 5 2-302(1) (2000). The U.C.C. states: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
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to consumer contracts of all sorts, and even on occasion to contracts 
between commercial parties.50 Its classic statement appears in Williams 
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., where Judge J. Skelly Wright identi- 
fied the following two elements: absence of meaningful choice on the 
part of one party, and terms unreasonably favorable to the other party." 
The former element is often characterized by "bargaining naughtiness" 
by a party with greatly superior bargaining power.52 The latter element 
is generally characterized by very harsh terms in the ~ontract. '~ The 
two elements have come to be known respectively as procedural and 
substantive uncon~cionability.~~ 
Several commentators have pointed out that a sliding scale has been 
used between procedural and substantive unconscionability, particularly 
when the abuse in one category-procedural or (especially) substan- 
tive-is p r o n ~ u n c e d . ~ ~  Nevertheless, one leading commentator asserts, 
without recognizing a sliding scale, that the conduct must be uncon- 
scionable in both the procedural and substantive aspects. He concedes 
that there have been a few exceptions, but he does not seem to recog- 
nize degrees of procedural and substantive unconscionability.56 The 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or  it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
Id. 
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 208 (1979) (tracking U.C.C. section 2- 
302 almost verbatim, without limiting it to sales of goods or to consumer contracts). The Re- 
porter's Note to section 208 says that it follows U.C.C. section 2-302. See also CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 31, at 370-71; 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 5 1 8 5  (4th ed. 1998) [herein- 
after WILLISTON]. 
51. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
52. See Williams. 350 F.2d at 449. Professor Leff appears to have coined the phrase. "bar- 
gaining naughtiness." See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485.487 (1967). 
53. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, at 156. Sometimes the second element is 
stated in terms of unreasonable allocation of risks in the contract. See also A & M Produce Co. 
v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating the second element in 
terms of unreasonable allocation of risks in the contract); American Software. Inc. v. Ali. 54 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating the second element as a bargain so unequal 
as to shock the conscience). 
54. See Leff, supra note 52, at 487-88. 
55. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, at 168-69; WILLISTON, supra note 50, 8 
18:14; John A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems. 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931. 950- 
51. 968 (1969); see also Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: 
The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 42 n.56 (1977). 
56. See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 33, 5 2-302.5. The first case Hawkland cites for the 
proposition that both elements must be satisfied is NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 
769 (Ga. 1996). But the Georgia Supreme Court said in that case: 
Research supports the statement made in Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda. [464 
So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)], that '[mlost courts take a "balancing 
approach" to the unconscionability question, and to tip the scales in favor of un- 
conscionability, most courts seem to require a certain quantum of procedural plus a 
certain quantum of substantive unconscionability.' 
NEC Techs., Znc., 478 S.E.2d at 773 n.6. This, of course, is an application of the slid- 
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cases do not support him. Some courts have acknowledged using a slid- 
ing scale in unconscionability cases;" others do it sub silentio when the 
abuse in one category is too much to ignore." 
In the diagram below, as in Figure 2, there are two curves. The 
lower curve (K-3) applies to consumer contracts. The upper curve (K-4) 
applies to contracts between commercial parties. The K-4 curve reflects 
the greater leeway courts give to seemingly one-sided commercial con- 
tract provisions than they do to one-sided provisions in consumer con- 
tracts. Both curves approach the horizontal axis more closely than the 
vertical, reflecting the courts' tendency to find unconscionability on the 
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ing scale theorem. 
57. See Hellstrom v. North Slope Borough, 797 P 3 d  1192. 1200 (Alaska 1990); Carboni v. 
Arrospide. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845. 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda. 464 So. 2d 
626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.6 (Ga. 
1996); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 635 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1979); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131. 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
58. Included among these cases are those finding unconscionability on the basis of lopsided 
terms in the contract (i.e.. extreme cases in which the sliding scale tips overwhelmingly toward 
substantive unconscionability). See. e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz. 172 F.2d 80. 83-84 (3d 
Cir. 1948); Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs.. Inc.. 907 P.2d 51. 59 (Ariz. 1995); Am. Home 
Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 889 (N.H. 1964). 
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Point A in Figure 3 represents the leading case, Williams v. Walker- 
Thomas Furniture CO.~' Walker-Thomas sold a stereo set on credit to a 
woman on welfare, knowing that she was a single mother with seven 
children.@' A "rather obscure provision" in the contract provided that 
her payments would be spread pro rata among all the items p~rchased.~'  
This meant that a balance would remain due (and a lien would remain 
imposed) on every item she had purchased until she paid the full bal- 
ance due on all items.62 There was no indication that the price charged 
for the stereo set or any of the other items was excessive.63 The trial 
court condemned the furniture company's business practices, but 
thought that it could not hold the contract unconscionable under the 
common law of the District of ~ o l u m b i a . ~ ~  The Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there were ade- 
quate grounds upon which the trial court might find uncon~cionability.~ 
The harshness of the pro rata payment clause entered into the decision, 
but the lack of any indication of exorbitant pricing would keep the rele- 
vant point on the horizontal axis from being far to the right. The court 
seems to have given considerable weight to the company's apparent 
misuse of its superior bargaining power.66 
Point B illustrates Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, I~c.~ '  A 
door-to-door salesman sold the plaintiff a solar home water heater for 
$6,512.68 Ten-year financing at 19.5 % interest brought the total cost to 
almost $15,000.69 Under the security terms of the contract, in the event 
of a default the seller not only could repossess the water heater, but 
also could foreclose on the purchaser's modest home.70 Reversing the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that unconscionability can be established with a 
showing of substantive unconscionability alone (although the opinion 
also suggests that the court suspected some degree of procedural uncon- 
scionability) .71 
Point C reflects the holding in Ilkhchooyi v. BestYn a commercial 
59. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
60. William, 350 F.2d at 448. 
61. Id. at 447. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 447-48. 
64. Id. at 448. The U.C.C. had not been enacted in the District of Columbia at the time of 
the transaction. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 448. 
65. Id. at 450. 
66. Id. 
67. 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995). 
68. Marwell, 907 P.2d at 53. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 53-54. 
71. See id. at 59. Point B in Figure 3 also illustrates the other cases cited supra note 58. 
72. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
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contract case. Plaintiff bought a dry cleaning business from third par- 
ties and took a sublease of the premises.73 The sublease was terminated 
before its term expired, when the sublessors went bankrupt.74 At that 
point the lessor, a management company, sent the plaintiff a new lease 
which contained prominent terms increasing the security deposit and 
adding the wife of the plaintiff's business partner as a lessee.75 When 
the plaintiff objected to these two changes, the lessor allowed him to 
delete his business partner's wife's name as a lessee, but declined to 
make any other changes.76 The lessor's representative assured the plain- 
tiff that in other respects the new lease was basically the same as the 
terminated ~ u b l e a s e . ~  In fact, unnoticed by the plaintiff at the time, it 
contained a new paragraph 14c that gave the lessor the right to withhold 
its consent to any transfer of the leasehold unless the plaintiff paid it 
three-quarters of any compensation he might receive for a covenant not 
to compete with the purchaser of the bu~iness.~' When the plaintiff sold 
the business and attempted to assign the lease to the buyer, the lessor 
demanded $30,000 of the $40,000 he was to receive from the buyer for 
his covenant not to compete.79 The court struck down paragraph 14c, 
citing both procedural and substantive uncons~ionability.~~ The court 
conceded that the procedural infirmities were not overwhelming, but, 
expressly applying a sliding scale, found the profit-sharing clause suffi- 
ciently unfair to tip the balance in favor of uncons~ionability.~~ Point C, 
in other words, was placed far enough to the right to be above even the 
K-4 (commercial contract) curve. 
A. Preliminary Injunctions 
"The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction," the 
United States Supreme Court has said, "requires the plaintiff to show 
that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and 
also that he is likely to prevail on the  merit^."'^ This, of course, is a 
two-factor test. However, in the same opinion the Supreme Court said 
Ilkhchooyi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768. 
Id. 
Id. at 769. 
Id. 
Id. 
Ilkchooyi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769. 
Id. 
Id. at 775-76. 
Id. at 775. 
Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc.. 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). 
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that a district court must weigh the interests on both sides.83 On the 
surface, that supplies a third factor. Treatises and several cases add a 
fourth: the public interest.84 Sometimes this fourth factor is stated as 
non-party interests, which could be simply the private interests of a 
relatively small group of non-parties.85 
In cases directly involving constitutional claims, federal statutes or 
regulations that embody a clearly identifiable public policy, the public 
interest factor is often stressed-sometimes to the exclusion of the other 
factors,86 but not always.87 In a recent case involving freedom of speech 
on the Internet, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
granting of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the federal 
Child Online Protection relying heavily on the plaintiff's likeli- 
hood of successfully challenging the act on the merits." The court gave 
cursory treatment to the other factors, relegating the public interest 
factor to a single paragraph at the end of the opinion.g0 And in the 
highly-publicized Napster case involving a copyright infringement chal- 
lenge to the use of a popular internet site for free downloading and up- 
loading of music, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
subject to some modification, the District Court's issuance of a prelimi- 
nary injunction based on a combination of the plaintiffs' likelihood of 
success on the merits and a balancing of hardships in their favor.g1 The 
public interest was barely menti~ned.'~ 
In the typical lawsuit between private parties, where no prominent 
statute or deep-seated public policy is at the heart of the case, the pub- 
lic interest factor is unlikely to be important. Nor are private non-party 
interests important unless one of the parties asserts them and they are 
legally protected interests that are likely to be affected by the litigation 
in some concrete manner.93 The discussion below is limited to cases in 
which the public interest and legally protected non-party interests are 
83. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931. 
84. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 2948 
(2d ed.1995) and cases cited therein. See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 118 (1991). 
85. See Laura W. Stein, The Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests Should 
Count in Preliminary Injunction Actions, 16 REV. LITIG. 27 (1997). 
86. See 1lA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 84, 8 2948.4. 
87. See, e.g.,  Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 
1972) (involving the Sherman Act); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d 
Cir. 1953) (involving the Clayton Act). 
88. 47 U.S.C. 5 231 (West Supp. 2000). 
89. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001). 
90. ACLU v. Reno. 217 F.3d at 180. 
91. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013, 1019, 1022, 1024, 1025 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
92. See id. at 1028 (addressing briefly Napster's First Amendment argument). 
93. See Stein. supra note 85. at 31-32, 50-55. 
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absent or too marginal to be included in the formula.94 
Irreparable injury and the balancing of interests may be regarded as 
a single factor.95 In practice, "irreparable" injury to the moving party is 
simply a fuzzy set where the harm to the interests of the moving party, 
if the preliminary injunction is denied, is likely to outweigh the harm to 
the interests of the resisting party if the injunction is granted. We are 
left with a sliding scale between the balance of hardships, on one hand, 
and the likelihood of success on the merits, on the other. As Judge 
Richard Posner has put it: 
If the plaintiff does show some likelihood of success, the 
court must then determine how likely that success is, because 
this affects the balance of relative harms . . . . The more likely 
the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of 
harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more 
need it weigh in his favor. This is a most important principle, 
and one well supported by cases in this and other circuits, and 
by scholarly commentary.% 
If the case does not significantly affect the public interest, the slid- 
ing scale diagram for issuance of a preliminary injunction takes the 
form of Figure 4 below. 
94. In a number of cases, courts have felt compelled to mention the public interest factor, 
but have treated it cursorily or have said that it was not important on the facts of the case. See. 
e.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1121 (7" Cir. 1997); 
J.E. Hanger, Inc. v. Scussel, 937 F. Supp. 1546, 1556-57 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Sluiter v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 979 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (E.D. Mich. 1997); La Calhtne, 
Inc. v. Spolyar. 938 F. Supp. 523. 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
95. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1984). 
96. Roland Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at 387 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner's approach was 
based on a balancing model set forth in John Leubsdorf. The Standard for Preliminary Injunc- 
rionr, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540-48 (1978). Judge Posner articulated his approach mathemati- 
cally in Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod. Lid., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986). but 
the mathematics may have proved too daunting for trial judges. See, e.g., Cleveland Hair Clinic. 
Inc. v. Puig, 968 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The wording of the sliding scale for- 
mula differs somewhat among the federal circuits. See, e.g.. Amazon.com. Inc. v. Barnesandno- 
ble.com, Inc.. 239 F.3d 1343. 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Brenntag Int'l Chems.. Inc. v. Bank of 
India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v. State Univ. of New York, 635 F. Supp. 
1243, 1250 (E.D. N.Y. 1986). For other sliding scale cases, see Duct-0-Wire Co. v. U.S. 
Crane, Inc.. 31 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Corp.. 833 
F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1987); Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997); United 
States v. Any & All Assets of Shane Co., 816 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. N.C. 1991); Dixon v. 
Thatcher, 742 P.2d 1029 (Nev. 1987); Penn v. Transp. Lease Hawaii, Ltd., 630 P.2d 646 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 1981. See also Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Pre- 
liminary Injunctions. 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 870-84 (1989) (advocating a balancing test without 
fully accepting Judge Posner's approach). 
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It has been pointed out that likelihood of success, like irreparable 
harm, is not a simple prop~sition.~' Not only are there degrees of like- 
lihood, but there may be a question about what constitutes success-a 
fuzzy set. For example, there may be a strong likelihood of partial suc- 
c e ~ s . ~ ~  In such a case, the vertical axis in the diagram may be regarded 
as a measure of the likelihood that the moving party will succeed in 
obtaining satisfactory relief, even if it is not the full relief the complaint 
sought. 
Point zero, at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal axes, is 
the point on the horizontal axis at which the harm to the moving party, 
if the preliminary injunction is not granted, is equivalent to the harm to 
the resisting party if the injunction is granted. The harm to the moving 
party exceeds that to the resisting party by greater degrees as we pro- 
ceed to the right on the horizontal axis. 
The preliminary injunction curve touches the top of the vertical axis 
(point A), indicating that very high likelihood of total success may well 
induce the court to grant the injunction even when the harm to the mov- 
97. See LAYCOCK. supra note 84. at 120. 
98. See id. 
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ing party, if it is not granted, would be no greater than the harm to the 
resisting party if the injunction is granted." The curve does not touch 
the horizontal axis, indicating that there must be at least some prospect 
of success if the preliminary injunction is to be granted.''' This is so 
even if the moving party can show serious harm in the absence of the 
injunction and the resisting party can show little or no harm if the in- 
junction is issued (point B). Nevertheless, if the moving party makes a 
considerably stronger showing of harm than the resisting party does, 
the prospect of success need not be great in order to get the preliminary 
injun~tion.'~' Hence, the curve comes close to the horizontal axis at its 
outermost point. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
In order to meet due process standards under the International Shoe 
formula memorized by all first-year law students, personal jurisdiction 
in a state court over an absent defendant depends on "certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial j~stice.'"'"~ In 
light of later cases,lo3 it is clear that the International Shoe formula con- 
tains two elements: power of the forum state over the defendant or the 
transaction (stemming from the defendant's or the transaction's mini- 
mum contacts with it), and fairness to the parties (traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice).'04 
99. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 84, 5 2948.3. For a recent federal case applying 
this approach without saying so, see Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245 
(2d Cir. 1999). For examples of state court cases turning explicitly or de facto on a strong show- 
ings of prospective success on the merits, see 14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Ass'n v. VRT 
Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417 
(Del. 1988); Penn v. Transp. Lease Hawaii. Ltd., 630 P.2d 646 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Com- 
monwealth v. County of Suffolk, 418 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. 1981); Clark County School Dist. v. 
Buchanan, 924 P.2d 716 (Nev. 1996). But see Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l 
Football League. 634 F.2d 1197. 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "at least a minimal tip in 
the balance of hardships must be found even when the strongest showing on the merits is maden). 
Id. 
100. See, e.g., St. Croix of Park Falls, Ltd. v. Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc., 2000 WL 
1053961, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. July 31. 2000) (mem. opinion). 
101. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 84, at 189-95; Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser In- 
dus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Bak- 
ing Co.. 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). 
102. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)). 
103. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California. 480 U.S. 102 (1987); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla. 357 
U.S. 235 (1958). 
104. Cf. 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND 
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 5 2.05 (2d ed. 1991). 
Casad says the two-part test consists of (1) purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting 
activities in the forum state (or purposeful contact with the forum state), and (2) overall fairness. 
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The Due Process Clause is primarily a fairness check on what gov- 
ernmental units (including courts) may do to persons. But in certain 
contexts, including jurisdiction to adjudicate, it also reflects a concern 
that a governmental unit may try to arrogate to itself unseemly power. 
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court stressed this power element 
in striking down Florida's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
Delaware trustee: 
Those restrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] 
are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or 
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limita- 
tions on the power of the respective States. However minimal 
the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may 
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal con- 
tacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of 
power over him.lo5 
The majority in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson referred 
to this passage with approval, and then struck down Oklahoma's asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction over the absent east coast Audi regional 
distributor and retail dealer primarily on power grounds.lo6 The major- 
ity in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court struck down Califor- 
nia's assertion of personal jurisdiction in an indemnity proceeding 
against a Japanese tire valve manufacturer on fairness (reasonableness) 
grounds,lo7 though there was a question about the legitimate assertion of 
power as well. 
H a n s o n ,  World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi were specific- 
jurisdiction cases. That is, the state's assertion of jurisdiction over the 
absent defendant in each of those cases depended on whether the claim 
for relief arose out of (or perhaps whether it was sufficiently related to) 
the absent defendant's activities within the state. Additionally, it is well 
established that a state may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant 
that has ongoing, relatively strong connections with the state, such as 
domicile or a principal place of business there, even if the claim for 
relief does not arise out of (or is not related to) activities in the state.''' 
Id. The first is essentially a test to determine the legitimacy of the forum state's assertion of 
power over the defendant; the second is self-explanatory. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws treats reasonableness (fairness) as an aspect of a state's power to exercise its judicial 
jurisdiction over a defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $8 35-52 
(1971). 
105. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (quoting Int'l Shoe. 326 U.S. at 319). 
106. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. 
107. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S .  at 113-16. 
108. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug- 
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due 
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 (1980). Professor Bril- 
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Professor William M. Richman has made a compelling case that the 
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction is fuzzier than the 
traditional analysis would have it.'"' He sees a sliding scale between the 
extent of the defendant's contacts with the forum, on one hand, and the 
relationship between the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's contacts 
with the forum, on the other.ll0 Under this view, some cases that fit 
neither the specific jurisdiction nor the general jurisdiction mold would 
nevertheless fall within due process bounds for personal jurisdiction."' 
There is indeed a sliding scale here, but it does not seem to be ex- 
actly as Professor Richman has articulated it. Rather, the sliding scale 
in long-arm cases seems to be between cognizant contacts with the fo- 
rum (as a measure of legitimacy of the forum's power to assert personal 
jurisdiction over the absent defendant) and fair play toward the parties. 
I have styled the first element "cognizant contacts" rather than Hanson 
v. Denckla's "purposeful contacts" because, as a slightly broader test, 
it can encompass general jurisdiction as well as specific jurisdiction 
without doing violence to the Hanson formulation. The second element, 
fair play, includes the degree to which the claim is related to the cogni- 
zant contacts, but also such things as the strength of the state's interest 
in providing a forum for the plaintiff, reasonable statutory notice to 
persons in the defendant's shoes that the forum regards them as subject 
to its long-arm jurisdiction, any inconvenience to the defendant of 
defending in the state, and any benefits the defendant has received from 
sources in the forum state.ll2 Although Asahi is the only Supreme Court 
case to say so, fair play also takes into account-or at least should take 
into account- any likelihood that the forum would make a constitution- 
ally-suspect, plaintiff-favoring choice of its own law if it hears the case 
on the merits.'13 
mayer justifies the accepted bases for state court jurisdiction in power (sovereignty) terms. Id. at 
85-88. 
109. See RICHMAN, supra note 3; see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 663-64 (1988) (discussing a similar sliding scale); EUGENE F. SCOLES. 




112. These fair play factors go a long way toward determining whether the defendant could 
have reasonably foreseen that it could be hailed into court in the forum state. See Shaffer v. 
Heitner. 433 U.S. 186. 215-16 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 297. Some cases in 
lower courts articulate these and other factors as separate elements of due process analysis. 
rather than subsuming them under "fair play." See, e.g., Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 
11 F.3d 1482. 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). 
113. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California. 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987). 
Although the Supreme Court did not say so, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). was also 
such a case. See Frederic L. Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in 
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL . REV. 94, 142-50 (1976). Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
may also fall in this category. 
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The diagram below illustrates all types of long-arm case in a state 
court in the United States without regard to the accepted taxonomy that 
distinguishes general jurisdiction from specific jurisdiction. It does not 
illustrate transient jurisdiction cases like Burnham v. Superior Court, 
where personal service within the state has been held to suffice without 
regard to other contacts or to any case-specific evaluation of fairness.l14 
Figure 5 
h i  
ogn-mt  I 
contacts I! ' 
Personal jurisdiction OK 
Fair play 
Curve J-1 represents the case of the defendant who is either a citi- 
zen or resident of the United States, or of another country with a com- 
mon law system. For such a defendant, any combination of cognizant 
contacts and fair play that falls below curve J-1 would indicate a lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Anything above curve J-1 would suffice for per- 
sonal jurisdiction. 
Curve 5-2 represents the case of the defendant who is a citizen and 
resident of a non-common-law country and who does not have a head- 
quarters or principal place of business in the United States. As will be 
shown below, the Supreme Court has applied more stringent jurisdic- 
tional standards to protect such defendants; hence the curve for them is 
to the right of the J-1 curve. For personal jurisdiction to be upheld in 
114. 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). 
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these cases, the intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play 
would have to fall above curve 5-2. 
Curve J-1 touches the vertical axis at point A. That point represents 
the case against a defendant who is a domiciliary of the forum state or 
which has its corporate headquarters or principal place of business 
there. In other words, it is the classic general jurisdiction case, in 
which the extensive contacts will suffice without any case-specific ex- 
amination of factors (other than proper notice to the defendant) that 
might go into a finding of fairness. 
Neither of the J curves touches the horizontal axis. In other words, 
there are cases in which the cognizant contacts are so minimal that no 
assessment of fairness is needed in order to reject jurisdiction. 
Point B reflects the combination of cognizant contacts and fair play 
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. W~odson.' '~ The purchaser of an 
Audi from a retail dealer in New York drove it west, heading for a new 
home in Arizona.'16 An accident in Oklahoma severely injured three 
occupants of the car."' The ensuing products liability action was 
brought in Oklahoma against the dealer and the New York regional dis- 
tributor.'18 There was no evidence that any other car the defendant dis- 
tributor or dealer sold had ever made its way to ~ k l a h o m a . " ~  The 
United States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could not constitu- 
tionally assert personal jurisdiction over the dealer or the d i s t r i bu t~ r . ' ~~  
Their cognizant contacts with Oklahoma, according to the record in the 
case, were very near zero on the vertical axis. Justice Brennan's dissent 
demonstrated that it would not have been terribly unfair to require them 
to defend in Oklahoma, but that was not enough to bring point B above 
the J-1 curve.12' 
Point C illustrates Asahi. Asahi, a Japanese tire valve manufacturer, 
sold valves to a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, which in turn shipped 
tubes containing those valves to California.lu Asahi was aware that 
tires with its valves were going to California.'" After an accident in 
California allegedly caused by an explosion of a defective tire, the Tai- 
wanese manufacturer was sued.lZ4 It sought indemnification from 
Asahi.lZ5 Asahi contested personal juri~diction. '~~ Four Justices con- 
115. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
116. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 289. 
120. Id. at 291. 
121. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J . ,  dissenting). 
122. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.  Superior Court of  California, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987). 
123. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107. 
124. Id. at 106. 
125. Id. 
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cluded that by placing its valves in the stream of commerce leading to 
California, Asahi had significant contacts with that state.'" A fifth, Jus- 
tice Stevens, clearly indicated that he thought so too.lZ8 The cognizant 
contacts thus may be plotted rather far up the vertical axis. But the fair 
play factors were weak. It was inconvenient for Asahi to defend in 
California. More importantly, California was asking Asahi to bear 
"unique burdens" by defending itself in an unfamiliar foreign legal sys- 
tem-a factor the majority said "should have significant weight in as- 
sessing the reasonableness" (fairness) of California's assertion of long- 
arm jur isdi~t ion. '~~ Moreover, the interests of the remaining plaintiff in 
the case (the Taiwanese tire manufacturer suing for indemnification) 
and of California in trying the case there were said to be slight.130 TO 
top it off, California would surely apply its own (generous) indemnifi- 
cation law to the merits-a constitutionally suspect choice of law under 
the circumstances. 13' 
The resulting combination of fair play and cognizant contacts-point 
C-is below the J-2 curve. But point C is above the J-1 curve, indicat- 
ing that if the defendant had been an American or Canadian company, 
or had its headquarters or principal place of business in the United 
States, personal jurisdiction over it probably would have been upheld. 
Not only would the sliding scale curve be lowered to J-1, but also the 
greater familiarity of the defendant with the forum's legal system would 
have pushed point C to the right.13' 
Points D and E also fall between the two curves, but they illustrate 
opposite results. Point D depicts Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. which involved a Colombian defendant in a Texas 
court, while point E represents Burger King,'34 where the defendant in 
federal district court in Florida was a Michigan resident. 
In Helicopteros, Helicol was a Colombian company with its princi- 
pal place of business in Bogoti.13' It provided helicopter services in 
Peru for a Peruvian consortium pursuant to a contract partially negoti- 
ated in Texas, but signed in Peru.'36 Payments under the contract were 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at I l l .  
128. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
129. Id. at 114. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 115. 
132. See Aristech Chem. Int'l Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 628-29 (6th 
Cir. 1998). cited with approval in SCOLES. supra note 109. at 309. 
133. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
134. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
135. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409. 
136. Id. at 410. 
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to be made to Helicol's account with a bank in New York City.137 Heli- 
col had purchased most of its helicopters in Texas, had sent its prospec- 
tive pilots to Texas for training, and had sent management and mainte- 
nance personnel to Texas for technical  consultation^.'^^ It had no other 
business contacts with Texas.'3g 
In an action by the survivors and representatives of four United 
States citizens who died when one of Helicol's helicopters crashed in 
Peru while performing the contract, the United States Supreme Court 
held that Texas lacked general jurisdiction over Helic01.'~~ The plain- 
tiffs had conceded that special jurisdiction did not exist on the facts.14' 
Apparently, the plaintiffs also failed to argue that long-arm jurisdiction 
might be based on a hybrid category falling somewhere between tradi- 
tional general and special jurisdiction. 
Helicol had enough cognizant contacts with Texas to position the 
case part way up on the vertical axis, and they bore enough relation to 
the claim for relief to extend partially out on the horizontal axis. Pro- 
fessor Richman, without addressing the significance of Helicol's for- 
eignness, has argued that the extent of Helicol's contacts with Texas, 
combined with the relationship of the plaintiffs' claim to those contacts, 
should have been enough to uphold Texas' long-arm j~r isdict i0n. l~~ So 
they should, if Helicol had been incorporated in the United States or 
had its headquarters or principal place of business in the United States. 
Hence point D is above the J-1 curve. 
The Supreme Court in Helicopteros did not mention Helicol's for- 
eignness except in its statement of the facts,143 so one cannot be sure 
whether the foreignness would have defeated jurisdiction if the plaintiff 
had argued all possible bases of long-arm jurisdiction. The reason the 
Supreme Court did not dwell on Helicol's foreignness probably was 
because, on the theory of the case presented to it (orthodox general 
jurisdiction), the traditional focus is on only one of the two usual fac- 
tors-the cognizant contacts with the forum. Had the Court focused as 
well on fair play, it probably still would have denied jurisdiction. In 
effect, it would have applied the J-2 curve because of the hardship to 
the South American defendant in defending this wrongful death action 
in the United States. It is also relevant that the jury in Texas had 
137. Id. at 411. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 418. 
141. Id. at 415. Bur see id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). Brennan expressed his dis- 
agreement with the Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs had conceded a lack of special jurisdic- 
tion. Id. 
142. See Richman, supra note 3, at 1338-40. 
143. See Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 409-10. 
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awarded the plaintiffs more than a million dollars in damage~'~~-a 
staggering sum by South American juridical standards. 
In Burger King, Rudzewicz, an individual in Michigan, obtained a 
franchise from Burger King, a Florida corporation with its principal 
place of business in Miami, to operate a fast food restaurant in a suburb 
of Detroit.14' Although most or all of the franchise negotiations were 
conducted through Burger King's Birmingham, Michigan, district of- 
fice, Rudzewicz knew he was obtaining a franchise from a company 
based in F10rida.I~~ His partner attended management courses in Miami, 
and the two of them purchased equipment from a Burger King affiliate 
in Florida.14' The twenty-year franchise agreement provided that pay- 
ments were to be made to Burger King in Miami, and contained a 
choice-of-law clause selecting Florida 1aw.l4' 
When Rudzewicz and his partner fell far behind in their payments, 
Burger King terminated the franchise and sued them in federal district 
court in Florida, basing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship 
and seeking damages for breach of contract.149 The Supreme Court up- 
held the district court's long-arm jurisdiction over Rudzewicz despite 
his paucity of physical contacts with Florida."O 
Rudzewicz and his partner did, however, have one important con- 
tact with Florida-they initiated the effort to obtain a long-term fran- 
chise from the Florida company.151 More significant to the Supreme 
Court majority, though, was the fair play element. Speaking through 
Justice Breman, the majority used a sliding scale: "[Fair play] consid- 
erations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction 
upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be 
required. 
Because Rudzewicz and his partner had signed a long-term contract 
binding them to deal closely with Burger King at its Miami headquar- 
ters, and had agreed in the contract that any disputes would be gov- 
erned by Florida law, the majority said that Rudzewicz could reasona- 
bly foresee possible litigation there.153 This amounted to a conclusion 
that there was a substantial degree of fairness in allowing Burger King 
144. Id. at 412. 
145. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464-66 (1985). 
1 4 .  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466-67. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 480-82. 
149. Id. at 468. 
150. Id. at 487. 
151. Burger King, 471 U.S at 466. 
152. Id. at 477 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984)); see also Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
223-24 (1957). 
153. Burger King. 471 U.S. at 480-81. 
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to haul Rudzewicz into court in Burger King's home state. It was just 
enough to place point E above the J-1 curve. 
Had Rudzewicz been, let us say, a Philippine small business person 
dealing with Burger King from Manila, it is doubtful that the Supreme 
Court would have allowed a court in Florida to assert personal jurisdic- 
tion over him. The jurisdiction curve would have shifted outward to J- 
2. 
Figure 5 does not attempt to chart Shaffer v. Heitner,lS4 another 
leading Supreme Court case, but it could be incorporated into the dia- 
gram. The holder of one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, 
a Delaware company, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a Dela- 
ware court against nonresident officers and directors for violation of 
their fiduciary duties to the corporati~n.'~' Jurisdiction was based on a 
Delaware statute that allowed sequestration of any property in Delaware 
of an absent defendant and sale of the property to satisfy any judg- 
ment.'" Stock in a Delaware corporation was considered to have a 
Delaware situs for purposes of the ~tatute.'~' A defendant would have to 
enter a general appearance in order to defend on the rnerits.ls8 Statutory 
quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer was thus obtained over those non- 
resident officers and directors who owned any stock at all in the Grey- 
hound Corporat i~n. '~~ 
The Supreme Court struck down the Delaware statute insofar as it 
subjected nonresident defendants to quasi in rem jurisdiction based sim- 
ply on the artificial situs of their stockholdings in Delaware corpora- 
tions, and held that the International Shoe standard should be applied to 
such cases.16" In the view of the majority, there were no cognizant con- 
tacts ("Appellants have simply had nothing to do with the State of 
Delaware"),16' and it was unfair to assert jurisdiction over defendants 
who "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court."'62 
In other words, the point of intersection between cognizant contacts and 
fair play would be virtually at the intersection of the horizontal and 
vertical axes. 
It strains credulity to say that the defendants, who knowingly be- 
came officers and directors of a Delaware corporation, "simply had 
nothing to do with the State of D e l a ~ a r e . " ' ~ ~  Nevertheless, even if their 
154. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
155. Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 189. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 192. 
158. See id. 
159. Id. 
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cognizant contacts moved them a short distance up the vertical axis, the 
intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play presumably would 
still be below the J-1 curve under the Delaware long-arm statute in 
force at the time of Shaffer. Very shortly after Shaffer was decided, 
however, Delaware enacted a long-arm statute for violation of a non- 
resident director's fiduciary duties, basing jurisdiction on the director's 
position with the Delaware corporation, rather than on stockholdings in 
it.'@ Thus Delaware addressed the unfairness point stressed by the ma- 
jority in Shaffer, at least as to corporate directors. That moves the fair 
play point on the horizontal axis far to the right, probably enough to 
place the intersection between cognizant contacts and fair play above 
the J-1 curve. Under the current Delaware statute, the case should come 
out the other way as to the (American) defendants who were direc- 
tors. 165 
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUES (OTHER THAN LONG ARM 
JURISDICTION) 
A. Change of Domicile 
Figure 6 ,  below, is a modified version of Figure 1, with two domi- 
cile curves instead of one. The D-1 curve represents the genre that 
tends to appear in appellate court reports, where the change-of-domicile 
issue determines which state's law governs devolution of movables at 
death,166 or determines whether the defendant in a civil suit is subject to 
the forum's long-arm jurisdiction.I6' Any combination of physical pres- 
ence in the new state and demonstrated resolve to stay that falls outside 
the D-1 curve (for example, at point A) will establish the change of 
residence in such cases-in fact, in all cases, since the D-1 curve is the 
more demanding of the two for a change of domicile. 
The D-2 curve illustrates the less stringent application of the stan- 
dard factors when the change of domicile is being considered only for 
such things as the right to vote or to register a car in the new state. 
Statutes sometimes use "residence" instead of "domicile" for such pur- 
poses, and the change in terminology may denote a legislative intent to 
apply a less exacting standard. On the other hand, it has been observed 
164. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 5 3114 (Michie 1999). 
165. See id. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the statute in Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 
A.2d 174 (Del. 1980). 
166. The law of the decedent's domicile at death normally determines intestate succession to 
movables, and the validity and effect of the decedent's will insofar as it applies to moveables. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $8 260,263 (1971). 
167. See id. 5 29; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
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that "residence" is often used synonymously with "d~mic i le . " '~~  
Whether the D-2 curve is regarded as a change-of-residence curve or a 
limited change-of-domicile curve is of little significance. A combination 
of fairly substantial presence without much demonstrated resolve to 
make a long-term home in the new state, as at point C in the case of an 
eighteen-year-old student attending college outside the state of his or 
her upbringing, would suffice for voting or car registration purposes. 
The D-2 curve could change shape somewhat, depending on the pur- 
pose for which "domicile" or "residence" is being used. For example, 
it presumably would shift somewhat to the right if the issue is whether 
the plaintiff may bring divorce proceedings in the new state, rather than 






state Domicile changed 
Extent of demonstrated resolve to move 
In Figure 6, the D-1 curve approaches the horizontal axis more 
closely than it does the vertical axis. The reason is that, for such things 
as administration of estates, the extent of demonstrated resolve to re- 
main in the new state often outweighs the extent of physical presence 
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 11 cmt. k (1971); Willis L. M. 
Reese & Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word. "Residence. " 6 VAND. L. REV. 561, 561 (1953). 
169. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11). 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
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there. A clearly demonstrated resolve to remain may well carry the day 
without much physical presence, but even an extended physical pres- 
ence will not translate into a change of domicile unless there is more 
than a minimal showing of intent to stay. 
Point A in Figure 6 illustrates In re Estate of El~on. '~ '  The dece- 
dent, Natalie Elson, had lived her entire life in Illinois until she trav- 
eled to Pennsylvania to study horsemanship and to work for a year on a 
horse farm.17' There was some evidence that she planned to return to 
Illinois at the end of the year.172 She took her horse and most of her 
personal belongings to Pennsylvania, leaving her jewelry and some 
other items in storage in 1llin0is.l~~ She opened bank accounts in Dela- 
ware, just across the Pennsylvania line, and said in an unmailed letter 
that she had moved to Penn~y1vania.l~~ Six days after she arrived in 
Pennsylvania, she was killed in an automobile accident.17' 
The trial court in Illinois held that Elson had become a Pennsyl- 
vania domiciliary for purposes of issuing letters of administration of her 
estate, and the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed.176 She had neither 
demonstrated a clear resolve to move permanently to Pennsylvania nor 
established a longstanding physical presence, but the combination of 
some demonstrated intent to move permanently, clear evidence of her 
commitment to stay at least a year, and six days' presence was enough 
to convince the Illinois court that she had changed her domicile to 
Pennsylvania.ln 
Point B represents the combination of physical presence and demon- 
strated resolve to stay in the new state in the well-known case of White 
v. ~ennant. '~ '  Michael White sold his West Virginia farm and left with 
his wife and livestock for a house in Pennsylvania, just across the West 
Virginia state line.'" The house was part of a large family tract that 
spanned the state line."' Michael had declared his intent to move into 
the Pennsylvania house and to make it his home.''' 
He and his wife arrived about dusk, unloaded their household goods 
and turned loose the livestock, but found the house damp and uncom- 
458 N.E.2d 637 (111. App. Ct. 1983). 
In re Elson, 458 N.E.2d at 640. 
Id. 
Id. at 640-41. 
Id. at 640. 
Id. 
In re Elson, 458 N.E.2d at 643. 
See id. 
8 S.E. 596 (W.Va. 1888). 
Whire, 8 S.E. at 598. 
Id. 
Id. 
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fortable.18' Michael's wife, Lucinda, was feeling ill, so they accepted 
his siblings' invitation to spend the night at the mansion house on the 
West Virginia side of the border.lg3 Lucinda, it turned out, had devel- 
oped typhoid fever.184 Michael remained with her in the West Virginia 
mansion house, going daily to the Pennsylvania land to care for his 
livestock.185 Lucinda recovered, but Michael contracted typhoid fever 
and died. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that Michael had adequately 
demonstrated his resolve to move to Pennsylvania, even though he had 
not slept there a single night.I8' Consequently, his personal estate would 
be distributed according to the law of ~ennsy1vania.I~~ Presumably, if 
Michael had stopped at the West Virginia mansion house because of 
Lucinda's illness before they had gotten to Pennsylvania and had never 
crossed the border before he died, point B would have fallen below the 
D-1 curve (and he would have been held not to have changed his domi- 
cile), even though his demonstrated resolve to move to Pennsylvania 
still would have been plotted rather far out on the horizontal axis. 
Point C illustrates In re Estate of  get.^.'^' The decedent and his wife 
retired from Pennsylvania to Florida in 1984.1g0 He registered to vote in 
Florida, obtained a driver's license, bought land and built a house 
there.lgl His wife and he lived in the Florida house, but spent the sum- 
mer months back in Pennsylvania at his wife's family farm.lg2 In 1988, 
he executed a will in which he said that he was "of Zion Grove, 
Schuylkill County, ~ennsylvania. "Ig3 He died in 1990 in Florida.lg4 The 
Pennsylvania court held that, for purposes of appointment of an execu- 
tor of his estate, he died a Pennsylvania domiciliary.lg5 His will had 
cast doubt on his resolve to move permanently to Florida, so his rather 
well-established presence there was not enough to change his domi- 
cile.'% For purposes of voting and obtaining a driver's license, how- 
ever, the combination of physical presence and demonstrated resolve to 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. White. 8 S.E. at 598. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at GOO. 
188. Id. 
189. 611 A.2d 778 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1992). 




194. Id. at 779. 
195. Esrare of Getz. 611 A.2d at 780. 
196. Id. at 782. 
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move was enough.lg7 The intersection is to the right of the D-2 curve. 
B. Choice of Law in Tort and Contract Cases 
Ever since Walter Wheeler Cooklg8 and Brainerd C ~ r r i e ' ~ ~  began to 
challenge Joseph Beale's mechanical, jurisdiction-selecting approach to 
choice of law, courts and academics have been struggling to find a new 
system or systems that will produce principled decisions that take ac- 
count of the policies underlying conflicting, potentially-applicable laws. 
Under Beale's rigid approach, the decision-maker facing a choice of 
law problem was supposed to characterize the issue, apply a predeter- 
mined connecting factor to that characterization, and be led inexorably 
to the law of a particular state or c o ~ n t r y . ' ~  For torts the connecting 
factor was the "place of wrong;" for validity of contracts it was the 
"place of contracting. "201 
Professor Beale's approach did not lend itself to a sliding scale. But 
he is no longer in vogue, and today only a relatively small minority of 
states retains his system in tort and contract  case^."^ The dominant 
method in these cases now focuses ostensibly on the law of the state 
with the most significant relationship to the occurrence (or the transac- 
tion) and the parties-the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Con- 
flict of Laws (hereinafter Second ~estatement)."~ Some "modern" 
states eschew both Restatements and use Currie's interest analysis or 
Robert Leflar's combined interest analysislbetter rule of law ap- 
proa~h.''~ And the notorious laundry list of relevant factors in section 6 
of the Second Restatement is so flexible that courts using it often ap- 
proximate the approaches of Currie, Leflar or some combination of the 
- - - - 
197. Id. at 781. 
198. See WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL A N D  LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
passim (1942). 
199. See BRAINERD CURRIE,  SELECTED ESSAYS O N  T H E  CONFLICT OF LAWS passim (1963). 
200. See 2 J O S E P H  H .  BEALE, A TREATISE O N T H E  CONFLICT OF LAWSpassim (1935). Profes- 
sor Beale was the Reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, which embodied his 
jurisdiction-selecting approach throughout. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
passim (1934). 
201. See BEALE, supra note 200, 8 s  311.1, 390.1. 
202. See Symeon C.  Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the 
Century Turns, 49 AM.  J .  COMP.  L. 1, 2 (2001) (showing which states use each choice-of-law 
method in tort and contract cases). 
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $8 145, 188 (1971). 
204. See Symeonides, supra note 202, at 13. 
205. The laundry list applies when there is no applicable statutory directive. It includes: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of 
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter- 
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of 
justified expectations. (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determina- 
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Scholars have devoted reams of paper to devising the best possible 
policy-oriented choice-of-law system for tort and contract cases. That is 
not the concern here. The focus instead is on what factors predomi- 
nantly influence "modern" courts' actual choices of law in tort and con- 
tract cases-on whether the courts use a sliding scale in applying them, 
and if they do appear to use a sliding scale, on how it operates in prac- 
tice. 
Professor Leflar was a pioneer in identifying factors courts actually 
use for choice of law. He identified five factors, not all of which would 
be significant in every case: (a) predictability of results, (b) mainte- 
nance of interstate and international order, (c) simplification of the ju- 
dicial task, (d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and 
(e) application of the better rule of law.'06 Each of these, except possi- 
bly the last one, has a counterpart in section 6 of the second- estate- 
ment.'07 
Leflar not only identified the "better rule of law" as a factor operat- 
ing in actual cases, but also advocated its explicit use.208 Some state 
courts of last resort now do But, in tort cases at least, those 
courts do not seem to reach results that vary significantly from the re- 
sults reached by courts using any other "modern" approach. All of the 
"modem" approaches show a propensity to favor forum law.210 They 
also tend to apply the law that favors re~overy.~" In practice, that is 
usually the forum's law because the plaintiff chooses the forum and will 
select one that promises recovery if jurisdiction may be obtained over 
the defendant. 
Often, of course, the forum will be the plaintiff's home state. When 
this is so, the forum will have an interest in applying its recovery- 
favoring rule. Even if the forum is not the plaintiff's home state, it will 
sometimes have other policies (such as protecting local medical credi- 
tors in a personal injury case) that would be effectuated by applying its 
own law. In Professor Currie's interest analysis terms, the forum is an 
interested state in these cases, and should apply its own law unless 
tion and application of the law to be applied. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 6 (1971). 
206. Robert A. Leflar. Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations. 54 CAL. 
L. REV. 1584. 1585-88 (1966). 
207. Even the last one-the better rule of law-arguably is a sharpened version of section 
6(2)(e): the basic policies underlying the particular field of law. 
208. Leflar, supra note 206, at 1588. 
209. Symeonides, supra note 202, at 13. Symeonides identifies Arkansas, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire. Rhode Island and Wisconsin as states using the "better rule of law" approach in tort 
cases, with Minnesota and Wisconsin using it also in contract cases. Id. 
210. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 357. 377 (1992). 
211. Id. at 378, 380. 
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there is a good reason not to. By definition, if the other state has no 
interest in applying its law, there is a false conflict and forum law will 
prevail. Even if the other state has an interest in applying its law, or if 
neither state has an interest, Currie would favor application of forum 
law in most cases.212 
To say that the forum has an interest in applying its own law when, 
for example, it favors a forum plaintiff, is not to say that its interest is 
equally strong in all such cases. Thus, if the relevant forum policy is 
tailored to a particularly vulnerable class of persons and the injured 
forum plaintiff is in that class, the forum's interest may be greater than 
if a more general compensatory policy is at stake. If the forum's pro- 
tective policy could be effectuated reasonably well in some way other 
than by providing tort recovery for the forum plaintiff, its interest in 
allowing recovery at the expense of defeating some other state's policy 
may not be strong-though it would still exist in some measure.'13 
Clearly, there are degrees of forum interest in applying its own law, 
ranging from no interest to intense interest. Forum interest is another 
example of a fuzzy set. 
Courts are loathe to defeat a party's reasonable expectations, espe- 
cially when he or she has relied on the expectations. They are as loathe 
to do so when faced with a choice of law problem as they are in other 
situations.214 Whenever factors relevant to choice of law are listed, pro- 
tection of reasonable expectations is included.215 Moreover, protection 
of expectations underlies some rules or approaches, such as the prefer- 
ence for selecting the law of validation in contract validity disputes,216 
that are not couched expressly in terms of expectations. 
Obviously, expectations play a far more important role in contract 
cases than in most tort cases, but they can be significant in some tort 
cases too-as when a person molds his or her conduct to a specific 
212. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method. 
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 261-62 (1958). 
213. Currie acknowledged that the forum's interest was not all or nothing. See Brainerd Cur- 
rie, The Disinterested Third Stare, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754. 757 (1963) (conceding that 
in some true conflict cases, the forum should re-examine the situation and apply a "moderate and 
restrained interpretation" of its own policy and of its interest in applying its policy to the case at 
hand). "Comparative impairment," as a method for resolving true conflicts, is based on the 
perception that a state's interest in applying its own law often is not absolute. See William F. 
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L REV. 1, 19 (1963). California uses 
comparative impairment as a true conflict tie-breaker. See Bernhard v .  Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 
719, 723-27 (Cal. 1976). 
214. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 6, cmt. g (1971). 
215. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 6(d) (1971); LUTHER L. 
MCDOUGAL 111 ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 5 94 (5th ed. 2001); cf. DAVID F. CAVERS, 
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 189-96 (1965). 
216. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG. A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS $5 175-185 
(1962); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS $5 7.2-7.4(d) (4th 
ed. 2001). 
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standard of care in the place of conduct, or when the owner of an 
automobile lends it to another without being able to foresee that the 
latter will drive it to another state with an especially broad rule of li- 
ability.''' Expectations have even been given significant weight when 
they go no further than a general belief that a person's conduct in his 
home state will be judged by that state's law, no matter where the in- 
jured visitor may reside.*18 Whenever legitimate expectations may be 
defeated by application of one state's law, decision-makers will take 
them into account in the choice-of-law process. And expectations, like 
state interests, are matters of degree. Expectations embodied in a 
freely-negotiated written contract that is shaped to the law of a particu- 
lar state, will normally be very strongly held;219 but an expectation that 
an accident in state X will be governed by the law of state X may be 
only vaguely held, and in any event may not shape the conduct of the 
person who has the accident. 
Even those courts that use defined elements such as those in section 
6 of the Second Restatement, do not normally identify as the dominant 
factors the extent of the forum's interest in applying its own law and 
the extent to which that would defeat the losing party's expectations. 
For these reasons, any attempt to identify two key factors or elements 
in choice of law cases must be undertaken with some diffidence. Never- 
theless, the two factors discussed above-forum preference and protec- 
tion of reasonable expectations-have enough explanatory and predic- 
tive value in torts and contracts choice of law cases to be singled out, 
and there seems to be a sliding scale between them. They are more im- 
portant explanatory or predictive elements than Leflar's "better law," 
because they identify key factors that are likely to shape a court's selec- 
tion of a "better law." That is, the better law usually will coincide with 
forum law (in the eyes of the forum) unless application of forum law 
would defeat or seriously impair a party's reasonable expectations. 
The two dominant elements interact in tort and contract cases as in- 
dicated in Figure 7, subject to one caveat. In the rare tort or contract 
cases in which the forum has no recognizable interest in applying its 
own law (because the case presents a false conflict in favor of the non- 
forum state or country) the model does not work. Nor does it work 
217. See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942. 944 (2d Cir. 1934); Schultz v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985); Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 
612 N.E.2d 277,283-84 (N.Y. 1993). 
218. See Baedke v. John Morrell & Co., 748 F. Supp. 700, 704 (N.D. Iowa 1990); Casey v. 
Manson Constr. & Eng'g Co.. 428 P.2d 898, 906 (Or. 1967). 
219. This is particularly so if the contract contains a choice-of-law clause. The Second Re- 
statement takes some pains to uphold such clauses if it is at all reasonable to do so. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 187 (1971). 
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predictably in an "unprovided-for case" in which neither state is inter- 
ested in applying its own law. These are rare cases because, as noted 
above, plaintiffs choose forums favorable to themselves, and even if the 
plaintiff is a nonresident, the court may well find (or may construct) an 
applicable forum policy, such as a concern that people who come into 
the state to litigate should have their cases adjudicated under the fo- 
rum's concepts of justice.*0 That would turn an apparently-false con- 
flict into a true conflict (or would turn an apparently-unprovided-for 
case into a false conflict in favor of the forum), and would fit the 
model. 
For reasons to be explained below, the curve in Figure 7 resembles 












1 Choose fdrum law 
i I 
1 I / 
I - - - - - -  - . - - - - - -  - 
I 
I l . 1  Y 
I ,/ I 
' '/ 1 - 1- - - - - - -Ig-/- - 
-.----&-I Choose 
I c: I no~ifonun law 
Extent to which resisting party's 
reasonable expectations would be 
h t r a t e d  if forum applies its own 
law 
The diagram assumes that the expectations are reasonable ones. 
Thus, for example, expectations based on an irrational delusion would 
220. See Leflar, supra note 206, at 1594, cited with approval in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 
N.W.2d 408, 412-17 (Minn. 1973) (applying forum recovery rule rather than Ontario guest 
statute when Ontario residents had an accident in the forum while on a short trip there). 
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not count (or could be placed at the point of origin on the horizontal 
axis). The vertical axis measures the extent of the forum's interest in 
the sense used in interest analysis; to measure it, one would have to 
identify the policy (or policies) underlying the particular rule of forum 
law and then determine how interested the forum is in applying the pol- 
icy to the facts at hand. Unlike the curves in Figures l through 6 ,  the 
curve in Figure 7 begins on the horizontal axis and proceeds northeast. 
The area above the curve, where the court is likely to choose forum 
law, is far greater than the area below it, where the court is likely to 
choose another state or country's law. The odds that forum law will not 
be chosen increase exponentially as the resisting party's level of rea- 
sonable frustration (were forum law to be selected) grows beyond a 
minimal level. But at, or quite near, the point of origin on the horizon- 
tal axis, where expectations are nonexistent or inconsequential, the fo- 
rum may be inclined to apply its own law even if it has little or no in- 
terest in doing so-even if the matter before it is an unprovided-for case 
in which neither state has an interest in applying its own law."' 
In Figure 7, point A illustrates the classic false conflict in favor of 
the forum, such as occurred in Babcock v. ~ a c k s o n . ' ~ ~  Two New York- 
ers took an automobile trip to Ontario, where they had an accident.223 
Ontario had a guest statute that would have precluded the plaintiff-guest 
from recovering against the driver, but New York had no guest stat- 
~ t e . ~ ~  New York applied its own law.w It had a very strong interest in 
applying its compensatory policy to a case in which the only parties 
were New Yorkers, and to do so did not frustrate anyone's reasonable 
expectations, or if it did, the degree of frustration was minimal. 
Point B represents Lilienthal v. Ka~fman."~ The defendant, a Cali- 
fornian, lent money in California to an Oregonian who had previously 
been declared a spendthrift by an Oregon court, thus rendering his ob- 
ligations voidable under Oregon law."' The obligation was enforceable 
under California law."' The California creditor was unaware that the 
borrower had been declared a spendthrift in Oregon, and apparently 
221. See Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973) (applying the forum's own law without 
frustrating anyone's reasonable expectations in an unprovided-for case). Bur see Nodak Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2000) (applying the other state's law. 
again without frustrating anyone's reasonable expectations in an unprovided-for case). As has 
already been pointed out, the model does not apply to a false conflict in favor of the non-forum 
state. 
222. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
223. Babcock. 191 N.E.2d at 280. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 285. 
226. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). 
227. See Lilenthal, 395 P.2d at 545. 
228. Id. 
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made some efforts to check his credit rating without discovering that 
crucial fact.ug When the Californian sued the spendthrift in Oregon to 
recover on a dishonored check the spendthrift had given him to pay off 
the loan, the Oregon court recognized the true conflict and agonized 
over the proper result, but finally chose Oregon law to defeat the 
claim.*' The court's choice thus completely frustrated the Californian's 
reasonable expectations, but the Oregon interest in protecting the 
spendthrift's family and the Oregon public fisc was sufficiently strong 
to bring point B just above the curve.231 
Point C illustrates Bernkrant v. F~wle r . "~  The plaintiffs were Ne- 
vada residents who owed one Granrud $24,000 for the purchase of a 
Nevada b~ilding.*~ At a meeting in Las Vegas, Granrud told them he 
would forgive in his will any debt remaining at his death if the plain- 
tiffs would make an immediate partial payment.u4 Plaintiffs made the 
partial payment, but Granrud did not forgive the remaining debt.*' He 
died a California resident. It was not apparent whether he had been a 
Californian all along or whether he had moved there after the Las Ve- 
gas meeting.*6 His promise was unenforceable under the California 
statute of frauds, but was enforceable under Nevada law."7 The Cali- 
fornia Supreme Court held that even if Granrud had been a Californian 
all along, California would protect the plaintiffs' reasonable expecta- 
tions and eschew the application of its own statute of frauds.u8 
Bernkrant fell rather far to the right on the horizontal axis, though 
not all the way because of the possibility that Granrud was (and was 
known to be) a Californian at the time of the transaction. But the case 
did not rise very far on the vertical axis because California had an al- 
ternate means of preventing any fraudulent claim against Granrud's 
estate. The purpose of a trial is to ferret out the accurate facts. The 
plaintiffs still had the burden of proving the oral promise. Any reasona- 
bly strong suspicion of fraud on their part could be brought out at trial 
229. Id. at 544. 
230. Id. at 549. 
231. The court mentioned that in Olshen v. Kaufman, 385 P.2d 161 (Or. 1963). a case de- 
cided a year earlier involving an Oregon creditor and the same spendthrift, it had decided in 
favor of the spendthrift. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 543-44. The disinclination to favor a nonresident 
creditor over a resident creditor may have caused the court to embellish the Oregon interest just 
enough to push it above the curve. Professor Cavers regarded Lilienthal as wrongly decided if, 
as apparently was the case, the California creditor checked Kaufman's credit and found nothing 
wrong. CAVERS, supra note 215, at 191-92; cf. WEINTRAUB, supra note 216, at 467 (treating 
unfair surprise as an overlooked issue in the case). 
232. 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). 
233. Berkrant, 360 P.2d at 907. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 910. 
237. Id. at 908. 
238. Bernkrant, 360 P.2d at 910. 
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even without Grandrud's testimony, and could defeat their claim with- 
out the aid of the statute of frauds. 
Point D exemplifies Bernhard v. Harrah's Club.u9 The plaintiff, a 
Californian, suffered severe injuries when an automobile driven by 
Fern Myers, also a Californian, collided with his motorcycle in Cali- 
fornia as Ms. Myers was driving back from an evening at Harrah's 
Club in Nevada.240 Ms. Myers was intoxicated at the time.241 The plain- 
tiff sued Harrah's Club for damages, claiming that the club proximately 
caused his injuries by continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to Ms. 
Myers after she was obviously int~xicated.~~' California imposed liabil- 
ity on tavern keepers for such conduct, but Nevada did not.243 At the 
time of the incident, though, Nevada imposed criminal penalties for 
serving liquor to an intoxicated person.24" The California policy was to 
protect members of the public from harm by imposing a duty of care on 
tavern keepers; the Nevada policy was to preclude tavern keepers from 
being exposed to ruinous liability every time they served drinks.245 The 
California Supreme Court resolved the true conflict by using a com- 
parative impairment approach; the California policy would suffer 
greater impairment if Nevada law were applied than the Nevada policy ' 
would if California law were applied, so the court chose California 
California had a strong interest in applying its own law. The injured 
plaintiff was a Californian and the intoxicated driver was endangering 
safety on the California highways. Many Californians travel to nearby 
Nevada gambling establishments and some of them could be expected to 
drive home after consuming some alcoholic beverages. Consequently, 
the risk of accidents in California from drunk driving emanating in Ne- 
vada was substantial and might be reduced by applying California's 
compensatory rule; therefore, point D is high on the vertical axis. It is 
only part way out on the horizontal axis because Harrah's Club is near 
the California border, and it advertises regularly in California; thus, 
Harrah's Club officials could foresee that intoxicated Californians 
might drive back to California while still under the influence. More- 
over, Harrah's Club would not have expected that serving alcoholic 
beverages to obviously-intoxicated patrons would be risk-free since that 
conduct was criminal in Nevada at the time of the incident. But if the 
239. 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976). 
240. Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 720. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 721. 
244. Id. at 721, 725. 
245. Bernhard. 546 P.2d 725. 
246. Id. at 725-26. 
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defendant had been a small bar in Reno that did no advertising in Cali- 
fornia, point D would have been further to the right on the horizontal 
axis and lower on the vertical axis, bringing it below the curve. Even 
though tavern keeper liability cases like Bernhard are tort cases, the 
reasonable expectations of the defendant can play a significant role. 
Another California tort case, Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil 
CO.,~~'  fits nicely into Figure 7. The Vice-President of a California cor- 
poration went to a business meeting at the defendant's premises in Lou- 
isiana, where he was injured through the negligence of the defendant."' 
A recent Louisiana case had held that a corporate plaintiff had no cause 
of action for such an injury to a key empl~yee."~ The California Su- 
preme Court assumed for purposes of the case that a corporate em- 
ployer would have a civil remedy against a tortfeasor under a provision 
of the California Civil Code of 1872.250 Nevertheless, it found that the 
1872 statute was archaic and rarely applied, so California's interest in 
applying it to this case was slight.=' On the other hand, the Louisiana 
defendant "would most reasonably have anticipated a need for the pro- 
tection of premises' liability insurance based on Louisiana law."252 
Consequently, the California court chose Louisiana Like Bernk- 
rant v. ~ o w l e r , ~ ~  the case fell at point C in Figure 7. 
Choice-of-law clauses in contracts provide another illustration. A 
contract containing a clause selecting a validating non-forum law would 
fall very near the right end of the horizontal axis, at least if the clause 
is not simply boilerplate in an adhesion contract. The curve slants 
sharply upward just before it reaches its right extremity, indicating that 
in these cases it is quite likely that such a clause will be upheld. Only if 
the result thus reached would run counter to a strong forum public pol- 
icy that applies to the facts at hand (placing the case high on the verti- 
cal axis) would forum law override the parties'  expectation^.^^ 
Fuzzy logic is at-large in the law. At least in the situations exam- 
247. 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978). 
248. Offshore Rental, 583 P.2d at 723. 
249. Id. at 724. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 729. 
252. Id. 
253. Offshore Rental, 583 P.2d at 729. 
254. 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). 
255. The Second Restatement would apply the invalidating fundamental policy of a state with 
a materially greater interest than the chosen state, even if the more interested state were not the 
forum. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 187(2)(b) (1971). It would be unusual. 
though, if a forum found that any state except itself had such a materially greater interest. Cf. 
EHRENZWEIG. supra note 216. 5 183. 
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ined in this Article, seemingly distinct elements of legal formulae are 
interrelated. It is not helpful to think of an element as either being met 
or not met, in most cases. It will be met (or not met) to a degree. It 
will be an unusual case when the degree equals one (i.e., loo%), and 
perhaps only a little less unusual when it equals zero. 
When two elements need to be met in order to satisfy a legal for- 
mula, the outcome is determined by the relationship between the de- 
grees to which each element is met. The more fully one is met, the less 
filly the other need be. This sliding scale can be illustrated by a curve, 
or in some instances by more than one curve, between a horizontal and 
a vertical axis. The slope and position of each curve will vary, depend- 
ing on the issue to be resolved by the formula. This is not a precise 
exercise, but it can be done with enough accuracy to supply insights 
into what courts and other decision-makers are doing-whether they say 
so or not. Consequently, it is useful in predicting the outcomes of fu- 
ture cases where dual-element legal formulas are at work. 
The sliding scale theorem also illustrates a significant feature of the 
legal process: judges and lawyers are inclined to speak in terms of ab- 
solutes (there either is or is not a likelihood of irreparable harm in a 
preliminary injunction situation), but the absolutes become relative 
when they are applied to resolving disputes arising from the untidy 
compartments of human and institutional Strict rules tend to 
become malleable standards. The two-element formula provides one 
example of how that process can operate. 
256. I would argue that there indeed are absolutes in the realm of ethics or morality, but that 
is a different matter from the resolution of disputes over temporal matters. 

